The Socio-Economic Implications of the Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria: 2009-2013
Chapter One
Objectives of the Study
The broad objectives of the study are to examine the activities of Boko Haram and its socio-economic implications on Nigeria‘s development. Using Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria as a case study. To achieve This, specifically, this research work is designed to examine the following:
- To determine if poverty is inducing the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria
- To assess the socio-economic implication of Boko Haram insurgence on the nation. (Nigeria)
- To determine if dialogue is a desideration of the Boko Haram menace in Nigeria
Chapter Two:
The Driving Forces of the Boko Haram Insurgency
Book Haram activities in the northern part of Nigeria, which have effected Nigeria‘s socio-economic activities greatly have three major forces that caused the Boko Haram Menace in Nigeria, which are political, religious and ethnic forces.
The religious, political and ethnic factor of the Boko Haram Islamic sect is not clearly defined judging by the activities of the group. This is notwithstanding that the groups have being described as one of the Islamic terrorist operating in the globe. The fact still remains that one cannot actually say if the group are for personal vendetta or religious zealotry.
However, the only parameter for judging the political, ethnic and religious factor of the Boko Haram Islamic sect is only by a proper evaluation of its activities. The activities are stipulated from its violent attacks, ideologies mode of recruitment, membership, funding etc. Abonyi (2006:27).
This is the only yardstick that can juxtapose the religious, political and ethnic factor of the Boko Haram sect. Deducting from the discussion so far, it is glaring that the issue of Boko Haram Islamic sect is purely based on its own teaching, belief and doctrine. unlike what may be referred to as ethnic based militia. It is evidently seen that its activities are not in anyway in time with the other groups of ethnic militia abound in the country. For instance the movement for the emancipation of the Niger- Delta (MAND) which is a militia group from Niger Delta or south-south region, which in purely on ethnic factor militia with no religious affiliations. The group was only fighting and agitating for equitable distribution of the mineral resources in their land, that their land have been destroyed by the oil in their land and they cannot feed themselves properly because of the effect of oil spillage and that government have properly abounded them to die and from the product of their land that sustains the whole federation. Hence its basis was puely outstanding. Sequal to this is the Oduawa peoples congress (OPC) which was based on the Yoruba region with the sole aim of providing security and other activities as it may concern to operation. There was also the Bakasi Boys, which was an ethnic militia based in the south-eastern state. Some state governors in these parts of the country even went an extra mile to legalize its activities through the state legislature.
Chapter Three:
Implication of the Boko Haram Insurgency
The foregoing appearance of Boko Haram terrorism and many other incidents in Nigeria are signs to show that violent acts of terrorism are becoming frequent in Nigeria and they constitute a threat top national stability, socio-economic development in Nigeria and also to the national stability and security. These violent criminal acts have all the elements of crime (terror), except that their perpetrators do not accept their fault even in the face of evidence. Example, Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf denying involvement in some of the attacks carried out in Nigeria (Wikipedia, Boko Haram).
Chapter Four:
Strategies for Addressing the Menace of the Boko Haram Insurgency
In every state, there exist a sovereign body, this body is vested with all the power and legal authority to make and enforce law which will regulate the behavour and the activities of people in the society in order to prevent the society from becoming or deteriorating into what Thomas Hobble represented to a primitive society where life a solitary, nasty, poor and brutish.
Chapter Five:
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation
Summary
This analysis highlights the importance of perception and beliefs in the study of terrorism and Counterterrorism An individual‘s choice to engage in order disengage from-terrorism occurs at the intersection of ideas, perceptions, and opportunities.
Successful terrorist organization capitalizes on an environment in which their ideology resonates and their grievances are considered legitimate by smart, competence individuals. From this perspective, it becomes clear that Nigeria‘s counterterrorism strategy which has mostly focused on killing or capturing individuals, interdicting finances and so forth, will not lead to victory unless combined with a concerted effort to discredit the organization, its leaders and ideology, and influence the perceptions of potential supporters within the community targeted by the organization. Combating terrorism effectively as not only a matter of appropriately directing kinetic force to identified target; rather, the primary challenges involve acquiring contextually relevant intelligence and affecting perspectives and belief system in ways that create significant difficulties for terrorist organization‘s ideology to find local resources.
Counterterrorism strategy should focus on at least three areas: organizations, environmental conditions, and perceptions. It involves attacking terrorist organizations and their members, degrading their functional capabilities, encouraging ―leaving‖ alternatives and supporting socio-political entities that draw support away from them. It also involves mitigating socio-political conditions and other grievances which have historically been used by terrorist organizations to justify their use of violence. Here, the instrument of soft power are just as important in helping combat terrorism as a nation‘s security forces. Legitimacy in effort is also critical, in that it effects the quality of intelligence needed to identify and take away from the terrorist group the things that facilitate their operations, like safe heavens, weapons proliferation, weak boarder control, and illicit financial networks.
Boko Haram has evolves over the past years into a type of threat the Nigerian government has not dealt with before. In the recent past, militant group employing terrorist tactics were mainly confirmed to the Niger Delta, were focused on economic grievance and targets, and could be bought off. Some observers have been quick to point out the promising potential of the government ―amnesty‖ programme launched in 2009 under the Yar‘Adua regime as an attempt to quell the violence in Niger Delta, based on recommendation made by the Niger Deltas Technical Committee in 2008. One report estimated that 20, 192 militants surrendered their weapons, though others have suggested that there are still ten thousands, of weapons available throughout the Niger Delta Punch Newspaper (30, May, 2011). Many in the hands of small gangs who are either engaging in low level criminal activity or adopting a ―wait and see‖ attitude toward the new administration of
Goodluck Jonathan. Of note, though, the amnesty program has focused only on former militants, it did not address future generations of militant.
Moreso, to do that, the government must address the grievance that motivate those militant to organize and launch violent attack, as well as the enabling environmental factor that sustain the resonance of these groups political ideologies.
The same grievances and factors must also be addressed in a comprehensive effort to defeat Boko Haram. Interestingly, in May 2011 the new governor of Borno state Kashim shettima, offered an amnesty deal to Boko Haram sects but a spokesman for the sect rejected the deal during an interview on a BBC Hausa radio program, stressing that the group‘s reasons of not accepting the amnesty are: first we do not believe in the Nigeria constitution and secondly we do not believe in democracy but only in law of Allah. It is highly unlikely that Boko Haram can be appeased by any amnesty program or a policy to bring better employment and education prospects to their home region. Sun newspaper 12 May 2011 p. 3). Theirs is an intractable ideology, with a broad array of potential targets and mostly importantly of all, a belief that their religious devotion will result in victory.
The socio-economic activities in the norther part of the country effected with the activities of Boko Haram insurgence, people cannot transact their business, disputing people for their original places. All these socio-economic changes combine to produce a sense of insecurity and vulnerability among northern Nigerians, and particularly among Muslim communities. This, in turn, offers insight into why Boko Haram‘s ideology has resonated among many including frustrated university graduates who find legitimacy in their argument that western society has failed them, their aspirations cannot be met by the current in place.
Further, unlike the Niger Delta militant groups, Boko Haram insurgence has opportunities to garner assistance from established Jihadist group in all parts of Africa, and perhaps even the global Jihadist network, through which they could acquire weapons, knowledge, finance, and additional ideological support. In short, Nigeria is now facing a kind o terrorists threat ―Boko Haram activities‖ that has become tragically familiar to the U.S. and other west allies who have been targets of radical salafi-jihadist violence in recent years.
There is much that external actors could offer in the form of lesson learned, including the need to protect influencial moderates within the Muslim communities of the north against retributional attacks by Boko Haram. This situation in Northern Nigeria requires a sense of urgency and co-operations, interagency, rational and international among both governmental and non- governmental entities. For the sake of all Nigerians, one hopes that all those who can contribute to the solution will rise to the occasion before the situation deteriorates further.
This research work was designed to investigate and possibly establish the challenges of Boko Haram insurgence and its socio-economic implication on Nigeria. The aim of this investigation is to ascertain the security and socio-economic implication of Boko Haram in Nigeria and to explore and give alternative measures to manage the spreading of their nefarious activities in the northern parts of the country. It also goes further in exploring issues of anti-terrorism (AT) measures in curtailing the nefarious activities of Boko Haram.
Boko Haram is not just any other group pursuing its legitimate interest in the society. This is a fringe religious terrorist group that has virtually declared war on the Nigeria state. It has killed and maied hundreds of innocent Nigeria through bomb attacks in several states including Abuja. It defiance of lawful authority is demonstrate by relentless attacks on policeman and soldiers. Boko Haram has sacked police station, carting away arms and ammunition from their army. The group has assulted prisons and freed criminals. Therefore, insecurity becomes the order of the day, where bandits had grown wings, frying to overpower the custodian of he state socio-economic development.
Many are obvious to the fact that our are ethnicity, religion poverty and underdevelopment, I have long affirmed that lack of electricity, weakened public institution, poor governance, and unethical leadership are the colossal symptoms of the collective challenges we must over, both political and psychological for the years ahead. Nigeria people must be saved from the menace of the group ―Boko Haram‖. This can be achieved through more intelligence work. The police should police more liaise more with the communities. The police should make all efforts to win the information (gridding). The police should give the people the cause to trust the police force. Also, the government should give the police adequate equipment to carryout their activities and also government should motivate the police force and other security agencies to be able in effectively combat violent crimes.
In order words, security is paramount for the survival of any nation and its citizens, the defective security structure with obsolete equipment and visionless approach is not a good measure for Nigerians state, any conflict will effect and destabilize the entire West Africa Sub-region. In curtailing or curbing insecurity, there must be proactive strategies rather than fire-fighting approach towards combating crime in the country. My advice for the Nigeria‘s populace; security is a collective responsibility, government is doing now, communities will have to do their own and most importantly, the individuals must operate and take the terror challenges seriously, by given police and other security agencies relevant information and the financial of the Boko Haram evil acts exposed and brought to justice for good measurers because there cannot be development in a state of anarchy, doom and insecurity, so, the government should use its might to swell this ravaging sect.
The study adopts the frustration – aggression theoretical approach in explaining Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, especially in the Northern part of the country. The theory which best explicates the intent of the research, asserts that in an attempt to explain aggression, there is difference between what people feel they want or deserve to what they actually get and difference between expected need and satisfaction. The theory further talks about issues of the tendency for people confront those hold responsible for frustrating their ambition. The theory goes along way in explaining that aggression is not just undertakes as a natural reaction or instinct but is the outcome of frustration and a situation where the legitimate desire of an individual is denied either directly or indirectly.
Conclusion
The northern states had witnessed crises before the recent Boko Haram bombing. We had the Maitasine riots in the 1980s in Kano, Bullum Kutu (1982), Kaduna (1982), Jimeta (1984) and Gombe (1986). What is novel in Boko Haram‘s case is their tactics. In the maitasine case, the proprietors were seen and known in the Boko Haram‘s case, the perpetrators are faceless. Their precise locations are known because it did not pay to fight government on equal terms, Boko Haram turned to isolated act of violence. The demand of Boko Haram includes the demand for implementation of full sharia law in the twelve northern states and eradication of western education in those states. These states are mainly in the north east. These states are mainly in the north-east, north-west and north-central geopolitical region of the country. In these states, business and life ―social life‖ has been disrupted because anyone can be a victim.
The government of Nigeria has struggled to deal effectively with these grievances and source of tension throughout the country and there is a pervasive belief particular among northern Nigerians that the government continually fails to address critical needs of those who aspire for a better future. While resources are surely constrained, it is the inequitable distribution of those resources, and the widely acknowledged levels of corruption among elites, that detract from the government‘s effectiveness. In turn, patronage and corruption few a general perception that government officials, to include law enforcement, cannot be trusted, and this further undermines the governments ability to influence the behavior of local community members in positive directions, away from the lure of radical extremist ideologies like that of Boko Haram.
An overwhelming majority of problems identified in this study can be tackled, but only by a capable government that is seen by its citizens as legitimate and trustworthy. There is must that Nigeria‘s government can and must do to reduce alienations and build trust and legitimacy among its citizens particularly in the northern region and address other enablers of terrorism described in the study.
The core problem is perceived government legitimacy, or lack thereof, and how this provides opportunities for non-state actors like Boko Haram to capture loyalties, hearts, and minds in pursuit of their radical vision of the future.
Legitimacy is central to ensuring security, if corruption is not tackled effectively, and the use of force among military and police is viewed as illegitimate by locals, the counterterrorism effort against Boko Haram will be much difficult and much less successful than it should be for these reasons, according to recent congressional report, the US has begun to begin to publicly pressure on Nigeria‘s government to tackle corruption, poverty, encourage greater investment in the north, address poverty and jobless ―Unemployment‖, and promote government accountability and transparency of course, the government of Nigeria does not need the (U.S) united state or anyone else to tell them that they have corruption problem, the country leaders have acknowledge if for many years. Furthermore, these are problem within the Nigeria government who want to do something about it, and in some cases are actively trying. They need and deserve support and protection for their courage. But, based on this analysis of the underlying problems that have given fuel to the rise of Boko Haram, it seem evident that strengthening trust and legitimacy between state and citizens should be a top priority for the Nigerian government.
Recommendation
Having fully examined the body of literature on the topic under investigation, and a qualitative analysis of finding, my recommendations are thus.
Combating terrorism involves two sets of actions. Anti-terrorism (defensive measures) and counter terrorism (offensive measures). Anti terrorism (AT) is defined as ―defensive measure used to reduce the vulnerability of individual and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces‖. While counter terrorism (CT) Involves these offensive measure taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism programs are normally classified and addressed in various national security decision directives, and contingency plane. As such, only a limited amount of information about CT programs will be addressed.
As a logical point of departure, there are generally requirement for the sources of any counter terrorist campaigns. These principles are the following.
Objective: The general objective of combating terrorism programs is to neutralize terrorist group, this generally involves CT and AT programs. Neutralization in thiscontest means rending the source of threat incapable, not killing the terrorists. The death of the a terrorist simply create new terrorists and glorifies their martyrs. Example, the killing of former Boko Haram leader, ―Mohammed Yusuf‖ fueled the nefarious activities of Boko Haram which left 800 people dead after five days of fighting (Morgan 2011). In AT, the objective can be further refined as perverting attacks and minimizing the effect if one should occur. It includes any action to weaken the terrorist organization and its political power and to make potential targets more difficult to attack.
Unity of Effort: Interagency action is required to combat terrorism. Combating terrorism requires the efforts of many agencies, allies and friends. Unity of efforts entails ways to integrate the actions of various responsible security agencies in Nigeria and foreign governments. Intelligence is particularly importantand sensitive it plays the critical role in part rating terrorist cells and identifying the political cadres, which organize the terrorists cells. A thorough targuledge of the strategic culture‖ in which the terrorist exists is necessary to analyze the pattern of why, how and when they lauch their attack. Yet with all the media coverage of black- uniformed CT forces in action, a democracy‘s first line of defense against terrorism is solid police work.
Again inter-agency struggle over who is in charge should stop as are all important parts of one body fighting one cause. Better hamionization, collaboration, synergy should be seen in coming weeks as suggested in the chief of army staff‘s remarks few months ago (Dr Joseph S.M. 2011). Held up inteigence should be released and shared with relevant agencies thereby breaking the syndrome of intelligence monopoly.
In circumstance where multiple police and intelligence agencies have vague and overlapping characters and justifications, friction is bound to occur.
The solution has in negotiation and consensus building.
Legitimacy: Legitimacy is not usually a problem in combating terrorism since the right of self-defense is universally recognized and as agreed to between most countries, terrorist acts are crimes in peace, conflict, or war. Security forces might bring their legitimacy into question by failing to distinguish between those perpetrating, aiding, sympathize with their cause but do not engage in violent acts.
Furthermore, failure to consider the proportionality of response can often tarnish the image of legitimacy. An overreaction that result in the avoidable death of hostages while security forces are attempting to neutralize terrorist, for example, on 8th March 2012, during a British hostage reseller attempt to free Italian engineer franco Lamolinara and Brition Christopher memar abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostage were killed (htt://www.orlantsentinel.com/news/nation world).
Restraint: Restraint is necessary to both objectives andlegitimacy in the context of combating Premature action against individuals, for example, can be com reproductive if it interferes with developing intelligence in depth that might neutralize an entire terrorist group. Similarly, over reaction, such as imposing severe populace and resource control measure, can undermine legitimacy and unnecessarily irritate the civilian populate. Example, the overreaction by the federal government in killing Muhanmed Yusuf.
Security: Security is the most obvious requirement in combating Terrorists rely on surprise and the victims‘ confusion at the time of an incident. Antiterrorism involves physical security, operational security and the practice of personal protection. Properly planed and executed a viable antiterrorism program will reduce the probability of surprise while discouraging attack by raising the risk to the attackers. In achieving these, in Nigeria, adequate arrangements were to be put in place in terms of training and retraining of security operative on modern security management that is technologically based, and provision of modern equipment.
Intelligence: In combating terrorism, intelligence is extraordinary important. In addition to having basic information about the terrorists strength skills, equipment, logistic capabilities, leader profile, source of supply, and tactics, more specific intelligence is required. This includes the group‘s goals affiliations, indication of their willingness to kill or die for their cause, and significant events in their history, such as that of martyrs or some symbolic event.The specific intelligence is particularly important because most terrorist groups are interested in symbolically significant targets, example, the bombing of United Nations building and police headquarters in Abuja. Unless terrorists specifics interests are known predicting the likely target is pure
Other Recommendations
A structure to address the problem of terrorism should be established in Nigeria. If one is talking of narcoties, you go to national drug law enforcement agency (NDLEA), if one is talking of drug and foodcontrol, you go national agency for food, drug administration and control (NAFDAC), if one is also talking of safety on the road, and you go to the federal road safety commission (FRSC). Then what structures does the country use for terrorism? We do not have any structure? What is the composition of the structure? What is the headship of the structure? What defines the qualification of those to be in the structure? Etc.
Creating a reformatory home and a training ground for any terrorist captured. Any terrorist I recommend the person be presented, charge and sentereed if formed guilty by the law. Such individual should be detained and trained at the reformatory home as professionals to carry out any mission impossible that may need urgent attention in the country. If the person survives, he regain his freedom but under surveillance and if he dies he will be remember for his service to his fatherland.
The USS of Gridding System: In any military operation, we must first locate the enemy before we can concentrate our blows against him late know that in modern warfare we are not clashing with just a few armed bands, but rather with an organization installed with the population, an organization that constitutes the combat machine of the enemy, of which (fighting cells) are but one element (Trinquier, 2006: 67). Thrinquier proposed a simple ―griddling system‖ to gain control of both the population and the insurgents (ibid, 89-91). The starting point for thus griddling system will be in the urban areas of the nation, where insurgents can best hide, can be protected and supported by the local populace.
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