The Role of Mediation in the Russian-Ukraine Conflict
Chapter One
Objective of the study
The general objective of the study is the role of mediation in the Russian-Ukraine conflict. The specific objective is as follows:
- To examine the reason for the Russian – Ukrainian conflict.
- To evaluate the role of the United Nations in the face of a crisis.
- To investigate the mediating role of the European Union in the Russian – Ukraine crisis.
CHAPTER TWO
REASON FOR THE RUSSIAN – UKRAINIAN CONFLICT
Background To The Russian – Ukraine War
Ukraine is a relatively young state. It gained its independence in 1991 after centuries of being partitioned between Poland and Muscovy and then Soviet rule. It is divided based on ethnicity with Ukrainian majority and Russian minority, Russian and Ukrainian language, and religion, i.e., “Orthodox Ukraine and “Catholic” Ukraine or differences between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate” (Olzacka, 2017). Moreover, because of these long-lasting divisions, the Ukrainian sense of identity is still developing, intensifying the problem. The last official census in Ukraine was conducted in 2001, thus the information regarding Ukraine’s demographics is very outdated. However, it gives an approximation that is necessary to understand this conflict. In 2001, it was reported that there were 77.8 % Ukrainians and 17.3 % Russians. Moreover, 67.5% of the Ukrainian population spoke primarily Ukrainian and 29.6 % spoke Russian (Central Intelligence Agency, 2001).As pointed out by Lakomy (2016), “Ukraine has been an area of increasing differences and tensions, partly inherited from difficult historical processes, and partly developed during the post-Cold War era. It has become a country permeated by conflicting interests and long-lasting divisions.” Due to its dependence, first, on the Soviet Union and, now, the Russian Federation, several issues have emerged and complicated the relations between Russia and Ukraine. While almost the entire Ukraine was controlled by the Russian Empire, there was an important entity that marked its influence on the existing conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. That entity was Novorossiya (“New Russia”). Novorossiya is a historical region extending from Odesa to Donetsk and up north to Dnepropetrovsk. Russian sense of identity has been developing in these areas since then. Moreover, it led to an assertion among the Russians that the historical region ought to be under their control. The ethnic and linguistic differences were intensified by Ukraine’s long dependence on the Soviet Union and Russia, therefore thwarting the development of a strong sense of national identity of Ukrainians. Furthermore, having a status of a post-Soviet satellite state, even after official recognition of independence, further deepened the conflicting positions regarding whether Ukraine should lean more towards the West (the European Union) or the East (the Russian Federation). Nonetheless, many Ukrainians, especially after gaining independence in 1991, preferred to establish their own sense of Ukrainian identity free from Polish influence in the West and Russian in the East. On multiple occasions, proponents of independent Ukraine stood in opposition to Russian activities that were meant to consolidate their influence on the Ukrainian government. Such was the case with the Orange Revolution in 2004 that resulted after forged presidential elections in Ukraine. For years, the Ukrainians felt that they were denied means of satisfying their fundamental needs, i.e. food, healthcare, and safety due to the despotic and oligarchical control of Russia. Declaration of a pro-Russian candidate, Victor Yanukovych, as a winner of the elections, motivated those who voted for a pro-European candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, to start a series of protests in Kyiv’s Independence Square and other major cities. It was a clear sign that the Ukrainians were fed up with being dependent on Russia. The European Union’s mediating mission led by then President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski was successful to the extent that it provided grounds for settling the dispute within Ukraine. However, as noted by Kamil Zwolski (2018), it was perceived by the Russians as a Polish attempt to distance itself from Russia by ridding Ukraine from its Eastern neighbor’s influence. The conflict was resolved by the Ukraine’s Supreme Court, which ruled that the elections were falsified, thus revoking the Central Election Commission’s results. In the repeated elections, Yushchenko won and became the president whose goal was to minimize Russian influence in Ukraine and to cease the oligarchical pressures on the government and its policies.Despite the great hopes of the Ukrainians, Yushchenko failed in fulfilling his promised goals and Ukraine remained under Russian control and oligarchical influence on the corruptible government. Polish initiative and attempts to tie Ukraine closer to the Western Europe, or perhaps, to cut off the Russo-Ukrainian ties, interested the European Union, which had some reservations regarding the Ukrainian European aspirations (Zwolski, 2018). In 2008, Poland’s foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, and Sweden’s foreign minister, Carl Bildt, proposed the Eastern Partnership initiative that would tie Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Belarus closer to the European Union. Despite some reservations about this initiative, the European Commission (EC) accepted the proposal. It was possible because of the increasing threat exhibited during the Russian military intervention in Georgia in 2008, the election of a more sympathetic to the Eastern issues, president of France Nicholas Sarkozy, and due the realization of the Western European countries that they needed Eastern European support in the formation of the Mediterranean Union (Zwolski, 2018).
CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FACE OF A CRISIS
The Charter of the United Nations
The Charter of the United Nations was signed, in San Francisco, on 26 June 1945 and is the foundation document for all the United Nations work. The United Nations was established to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose. The Charter gives the United Nations Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security(Security Council resolution , 2005). In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”, Chapter VII contains provisions related to “Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”. Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter. United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the Charter. However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI. In recent years, the Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into volatile post conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. The Security Council’s invocation of Chapter VII in these situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can also be seen as a statement of firm political resolve and a means of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider United Nations membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions(Security Council resolution, 2005). Linking United Nations peacekeeping with a particular Chapter of the Charter can be misleading for the purposes of operational planning, training and mandate implementation.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE MEDIATING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE RUSSIAN – UKRAINE
Mediation and Peacekeeping in the EU Common Policies
Many of the European Union (EU) member-states had a long history of conflict resolution and mediation, however the Union as a whole has been rarely seen in this capacity in the past, mostly due to its limited approach, based mainly on confidence-building and post-conflict reconstruction instruments, and also to the inability to find internal consensus for a common position on a specific conflict. The EU’s peacekeeping activities have been usually triggered by the necessity to support the UN activities.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
SUMMARY
In this study, our focus was on the role of mediation in the Russian- Ukraine conflict. The study specifically was aimed at examine the reason for the Russian – Ukrainian conflict, evaluate the role of the United Nations in the face of a crisis and investigate the mediating role of the European Union in the Russian – Ukraine.
CONCLUSION
Based on the finding of this study, the following conclusions were made:
The majority of the Ukrainian respondents perceived the EU as on its side in the conflict – EU sanctions against Russia being the primary indicator. Still, the effectiveness of the EU’s policies, backed by sanctions, was tempered by perceived EU economic self-interest in Russia. Although Ukrainian elites perceived the EU as a biased mediator in their favor, they were not convinced that this will, in the end, protect Ukrainian interests, as the EU was seen to be shortsighted and limited by economic and security concerns. The lack of EU mediator effectiveness was, however, also explained by referring to Russia as a “tough case” uninterested in a negotiated solution
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the responses obtained, the researcher proffers the following recommendations:
- That the European Union in its quest to brokering peace between Russian and Ukraine should endeavor not to be biased against one party at the detriment of the other party involved in the crisis as this could lead to irresolution of the crisis.
REFERENCES
- Ademmer, Esther (2014). “Interdependence and EU-Demanded Policy Change in a Shared Neighbourhood.” Journal of European Public Policy 22, 5: 671–689.
- Andreas Umland (2019). Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework of Analysis,” in O. Elgström and M. Smith, editors, The European Union’s Roles in International Politics. Abingdon: Routledge.available at: http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en (accessed 7 September 2016).
- Barber & Foy, (2019). The Middle East Quartet and (In)effective Multilateralism.” The Middle East Journal 67, 1: 29–44.
- Barrett, (2018). Information, Bias, and Mediation Success.” International Studies Quarterly 52, 1: 25–47
- Blidaru, (2018). Mediating International Conflicts: The European Union as an Effective Peacemaker?” Journal of Common Market Studies 53, 5: 957–975.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992), ‘Report of the UN Secretary-General: “Agenda for Peace”’, June 17,Council on Foreign Relations, available at: http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/report-unsecretary-general-agenda-peace/p23439.
- Chaillot Papers, No. 130, EU Institute for Security Studies.
