Political Science Project Topics

The Military and Nigeria Politics an Assessment of the Domination of the Military of the Nigeria Political Space 1999 to 2015

The Military and Nigeria Politics an Assessment of the Domination of the Military of the Nigeria Political Space 1999 to 2015

The Military and Nigeria Politics an Assessment of the Domination of the Military of the Nigeria Political Space 1999 to 2015

Chapter One

Objective of the study

The general objective of the study is the military and Nigerian politics: an assessment of the domination of the military in the Nigeria political space from 1999 to 2015.

  1. To examine the military historical antecedent in Nigeria
  2. To investigate the role of military rule in the transition to democracy
  3. To evaluate the domination of the military in the Nigeria political space from 1999 to 2015

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORICAL ANTECEDENT OF MILITARY RULE IN NIGERIA

The Military in Nigerian Politics

The history of military intervention in Nigerian politics is usually traced to January, 1966 coup d’état. In fact, military invention in Nigeria can be said to be as old as the Nigerian state itself. It can be traced to 1914 when the first colonial Governor General, Colonel Lord Lugard, a British Army Officer, amalgamated the Northern and Southern protectorates to become a single entity called Nigeria (Suberu,1997). The name Nigeria was coined by Flora Shaw, who later became the wife of Lord Lugard.  The origin of the establishment of the Nigerian military could be traced to 1863 when a paramilitary unit was formed which was then known as the ‘Glover Hausas’. It was named after Lieutenant John Glover, the then Governor of Lagos, after its annexation in 1861 by the British Government. The Glover Hausas metamorphosed into the West Africa Frontier Force (WAFF) in 1889. With the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern Protectorates in 1914, it became the Nigerian Regiment of the WAFF in 1922. The Nigerian Regiment was renamed the Nigerian Military Force in 1956. The ordinance constituting the Nigerian Military Force was promulgated and changed nomenclature to Nigerian Army in 1960. The Nigerian Army became fully indigenous in 1963 in the wake of Nigeria’s attainment of Republican status via the Army Act of 1963. The Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force were established via an Act of Parliament in 1958 and I964 respectively. After Nigeria attained its independence in 1960, the military continued to be loyal to the first generation of Nigerian politicians until the first military intervention in Nigerian politics via a coup on 15 January, 1966. The happenings in some post-independence African countries was said to have also encouraged the coup d’état in Nigeria. Some of these included the 23 July, 1952 coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdal-Nasser in Egypt; General Ibrahim Abbond’s coup on 17 November, 1958 in Sudan; Colonel Boumedienne’s, Algerian Army Chief on 19 June,1965; Congo-Kinshasha’s military intervention on 25 November, 1965; Central African Republic’s on 1 January, 1966; and Upper Volta’s (Burkina Faso) on 3 January, 1966. According to Peretei (2004), ‘it was like a wild fire blowing fast across the black continent’. The coup and countercoup of 1966 began a dismal tradition of military intervention in Nigerian politics. The coups ousted the Balewa’s administration and marked the ascendancy of the Nigerian military to the political scene of the country and their concomitant power manipulation and control for also three decades (Zaira, 2013). The Nigerian state has witnessed eleven coup, counter and abortive coup d’états in her post-independence history.

 

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF MILITARY RULE IN TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY RULE

The First Republic Crisis, Military Incursion and Transition to Democratic Governance

Following the fall out in the Western region based Action Group (AG) political party and the inconsistent census, the Nigeria first republic virtually collapsed. By 1964, political competition had become very severe, and two major alliance of all the political parties contested the federal elections of that year. Electoral fraud was so rampant and so prevalent that the elections were meaningless and the results of the elections ending in a stalemate (Arikpo, 1967). As Arikpo reported, the events of the 1964 federal elections serious as they were, paled beside those which followed during the Western Region election a year later in 1965 during in which the electorate literally poured gasoline on opponents and set them on fire. The electorate literally took the laws into its hands and the Police seemed powerless. Following the events above, Nigerians believed that the military was the only institution in the country that could stop the political chaos and restore political order and stability, as well as public confidence (Ojibo, 1980). Subsequently, there was a military coup d’état on January 15 1966 where some prominent Nigeria political leaders as well as some high ranking military officers were assassinated. The military coup d’état of 1966 and eventual ascension to power by Major General Aguyi Ironsi marked the end of Nigeria’s first civilian democratic government. This was a welcome development to many Nigerians as it puts to an end to the civilian rule of the country, characterized by political tensions and instability. General Ironsi’s challenge was whether or not he could sustain the confidence the nation reposed in the Army take-over (Ojibo, 1980). New political arrangements and programmes were announced by the new head of State, which included a new constitution and handover to the civilian government. General Ironsi promulgated Decree No 34, abolishing the federal structure of Nigeria and replacing same with the new unitary structure. Part of the promise made by his government was to hand over power to the democratically elected civilian government as the military had no desire to prolong its interim administration longer than is necessary for the orderly transition of the country to the type of government desired by the people (Banjo, 1980). Although General Ironsi had the desire to hand over to the civilians, his short stay in office hampered the fulfilment of this mandate. As sectional suspicion mounted, by June 1966 it was already evident that another coup would take place, which later led to the killing of General Ironsi. Irrespective of the ethnic or political leaning of commentators, it was obvious that the killing of General Ironsi and the enthronement of General Gowon to political power extended the military rule in Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DOMINATION OF THE MILITARY OF THE NIGERIA POLITICAL SPACE 1999 TO 2015

The “Saint” And “Devil” In The Military Towards Democratic Succession And Civil Rule In Nigeria

From the retrospective trace of the role the military played in the political succession in Nigeria since the first republic to the “third republic”, the viable conclusion that could be reached is that the military institution play both positive and negative roles in shaping the political landscape of Nigeria. Similar notions and substantiations have been made on other strategic and enforcement organs of state such as the police in elections (Roberts and Obioha 2005) and in a fledgling democracy (Slingers and Obioha, 2015). Notwithstanding the magnitude and enduring negative roles in destabilizing inaugurated democratic governments or disrupting military – civilian transition, their positive roles in opposing long military rule and self-military succession could not be taken for granted. Precisely, the role of the military during the first republic could be seen by many political and social analysts as essentially disruptive of a fledging first independent government in 1964.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

SUMMARY

In this study, our focus was on a study of the military and Nigeria politics: an assessment of the domination of the military of the Nigeria political space 1999 to 2015. The study specifically was aimed at highlighting the  military historical antecedent in Nigeria , investigate the role of military rule in transition to democracy, and  evaluate  the domination of the military of the Nigeria political space 1999 to 2015.

 CONCLUSION

Based on the finding of this study, the following conclusions were made:

The domination of the military is still felt in all facets of governance in the country as the military elite accumulated a lot of wealth during their long stay in government. Adekanye (2003) argued that in 1999, when the country returned to civil rule, all the senior officers and Generals retired by President Olusegun Obasanjo were young millionaires. At the time President Obasanjo retired the military officers who held political offices or served during the military era, most of the retired officers were in their forties and fifties. They could not sit down and watch the polity doing nothing. They had interests to protect and it would be difficult to achieve that outside politics. While some went into business, others saw politics as an avenue to further exert their influence. They joined politics, contested, sponsored candidates and bankrolled elections. The military was largely responsible for the emergence of General Olusegun Obasanjo as President in 1999. From 1999 till date, retired military officers have been actively involved in Nigeria’s politics. The military has produced Governors (Prince Olagusoye Oyinlola, Osun State; Jonah Jang, Plateau State), Senators (Senator David Mark, a two term Senate President), Ministers, amongst others. They are playing major roles in business, politics, nation building and peace in the country. The retired military officers have also held sway for 14 years out of the current 21 years in the Fourth Republic.

 RECOMMENDATION

Based on the responses obtained, the researcher proffers the following recommendations:

  1. The study strongly recommended that the political class and elites should not allow a repeat of the country’s experience between 1979 and 1983 that led to the second coming of the military in politics.
  2. The socio – economic challenges confronting the country should be objectively addressed with emphasis on the alarming rate of insecurity and unemployment in the country.

REFERENCES

  • Adekanye, B. (1999), The Retired Military as Emergent Power Factor in Nigeria.Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books PLC.
  • Adekanye, J. B. (2003). The Retired Military as Emergent Power Factor in Nigeria.Heinemann Educational Book, Nigeria.
  • Ademoyega, A. (1981). Why We Struck: The Study of the first Nigeria Coup. Evans. Ibadan.
  • Adeniyi, P. (2010). Nigeria: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Daily Graphics Nigeria Limited.Ibadan.
  • Adunbi ‘How did Fulani herdsmen become ssuch bogeymen in Nigeria’ Africa is a Country 1 February 2018;
  • Afenaga, H. (1980), “Democracy Consolidates: Progress Report” Times
  • Agagu, A. A., & Ola, R. F. (2011). Development Agenda of the Nigerian State. (ed). Lord Keynes Publishing Company, Akure.
  • Agbaje, A. (1990b). Freedom of the Press and Party Politics in Nigeria: Precepts, Retrospect and Prospects. African Affairs,89(355), 205-26.
  • Agbaje, A. (1994). “Twilight of Democracy in Nigeria” Africa Demos, Vol. III No. 2
  • Agbese, D. (2000). Fellow Nigerians: Turning Points in the Political History of Nigeria, Ibadan: Umbrella Books.
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