Legislative Oversight and Good Governance in Plateau State
CHAPTER ONE
Objectives of the Study
The main objective of this study is to examine the legislative oversight and good governance in plateau state.
The specific objectives of this study are to:
- Examine the constitutional provisions of the National Assembly to use oversight function in Nigeria.
- Discuss cases of lack of transparency, accountability and effectiveness in the discharge of legislative oversight in Plateau state.
- Identify challenges of the National Assembly in carrying out oversight function in Plateau state.
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Conceptual review
Concept of Legislature
Legislature is referred as parliament in Britain, national assembly in Nigeria, congress in United States (Abonyi, 2006). The legislature occupies a key position in the democratic process of government, with the purpose of articulating the collective will of the people through representative government (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). Awotokun (1998) states that legislature is an arm of government made up of elected representatives or constituted assembly people whose duty is to make laws, control the activities of the executive and safeguard people’s interest. Anyaegbunam (2000) define legislature as the role of making, revising, amending and repealing laws for the well being of its citizenry it represents. Lafenwa (2009) defines legislature as people chosen by election to represent the constituent units and control government. OkoosiSimbine (2010) asserts that legislature is law-making, and policy influencing body in the democratic political system. The law makers can be described in the site of sovereignty, the expression on the will of the people. This is derived from the people and should be exercise according to the will of the people they represent. Bogdanor (1991) affirms that legislature is derived from a claim that its members are representative of the political community, and decisions are collectively made according to complex procedures. The state of the legislature has been identified as the strongest predictors on the survival of every democratic development (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). The centrality of the legislature is captured by Awotokun (1998) when he asserts that legislature is the pivot of modern democratic systems. Edosa & Azelama (1995) states that legislatures vary in design, structure, organisation, operational procedures, and selection process as well as sizes, tenure of office and nature of meetings.
In a bicameral type of arrangement two legislative chambers exist in a country; one chamber seems to dominate the other. Nwabueze and Mueller (1985) noted that when they viewed that there exist some forms of dominance of one chamber to the other in some legislation, term of office, size of the constituencies represented. However, they intricate rules adopted usually harmonize the legislative function of the two chambers (upper and lower chamber). Edosa and Azelama (1995) assert that bicameral legislative is common in federal states that stem from the imperative of one house to protect the interests of minority groups in such states. Nigeria operates in a federally bicameral arrangement on the dictates of 1954 Lyttleton Constitution. The House of Senate (Upper House) and House of Representatives (Lower House) jointly called National Assembly of Nigeria. The two chambers act as a check on other arms of government; such checks are minimal because the major policy demand debate is on party affiliations rather than national interest (Edosa & Azelama, 1995). This arrangement enhance passage of law and gives opportunity for division of labour between the two houses (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). In addition, bicameral legislature provides an opportunity for wider representation of various interests groups in a country from one democracy to the other. Nwabuzor and Muller (1985) notes that such factors like presiding officer, order of business, legislative process, legislative committee, intra-party discipline manner of debate consideration account differently among countries. Nwabuzor and Muller (1985) assert that countries that operate short-term tenure for legislature do so because the representatives reflect on the betterment of public preference in respect of government policy. The long-term tenure ensures the stability of national interests which has no changing public opinion.
CHAPTER THREE
OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHGT BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Introduction
In this chapter we shall look at the historical background of the National Assembly; the foundation of Nigeria`s Oversight. In looking at the National Assembly Oversight Functions, attempt was made to establish the National Assembly`s Oversight role on corruption in the Federal Public Service.
Evolution of the National Assembly
The history of modern legislature in Nigeria pre-dates the era of Nigeria`s political independence. It actually began in 1922 when the Sir Hugh Clifford`s Constitution was drafted. Clifford was one of the colonial governors that administered colonial Nigeria. This constitution created a Legislative Council due to increased pressure from the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA), a Pan-West African body founded by the educated elites from British Colonies of West Africa (Egwu cited in Gana, and Omelle, 2006).
The Legislative Council was composed of 46 members, 27 of whom were official members.
The Clifford`s Constitution (1922) introduced what was known as the “elective principle” which enabled the immediate emergence of the first Nigerian political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) (Egwu cited in Gana, and Omelle, 2006).
The Legislative Council, as provided for in the 1922 constitution had limited powers which amounted to its weakness. First, the legislative council was a mere rubber stamp of the wishes of the colonial Governor who was subjected to the whims and caprices of the colonial office in London. Second, the legislative council lacked the power to legislate for the whole country; the Northern Nigeria was still ruled by the Governor`s proclamations (Egwu cited in Gana, and Omelle, eds. 2006). These attendant weaknesses spelt the end of the Clifford`s constitution that necessitated the introduction of Richard`s Constitution of 1946. Richard identified the causes of failures of Sir Clifford`s constitution and introduced some modifications bearing in mind the political realities of the time.
One of the remarkable changes Richard introduced in his constitution was the expanded jurisdiction of the Legislative Council. The constitution expanded the competence of the Legislative Council to legislate for the entire country. It also created regional Legislative Councils in the (North, East and the Western Regions) three provinces. The regional councils were composed of two chambers: a House of Chief and House of Assembly, all with unofficial majority (Dauda, 2008)
CHAPTER FOUR
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNANCE IN PLATEAU STATE
Campaigns for the State House of Assembly Elections
The State Houses of Assembly campaigns ahead of the 2011 elections, which were initially characterised by an atmosphere of uncertainty later attracted the participation of the masses. In Barkin Ladi LGA of Plateau state, majority of those seeking to be elected to the State House of Assembly staged their campaign rallies at party offices. In some parts of Plateau State, the campaigns involved, among other activities, the use of drummers who sang the praises of the candidates they supported. The candidates of the three political parties that fielded candidates for elections, namely the PDP, APP and AD staged almost similar campaigns. In the case of the 2015 elections, the late release of the dates of the elections by INEC affected the campaigns by the political parties. This created an atmosphere of haste and confusion in the electoral process, including the campaigns. In Plateau State the campaigns featured the use of mostly posters which were pasted indiscriminately on residences and public places, and writings on rocks and bridges. Compared to the presidential and gubernatorial election campaigns, those seeking elections into the State Houses of Assembly made less use of the print and electronic media. Even those who made use of the print and electronic media hardly focused on, and addressed specific issues beyond the general promise to improve the lives of the people; they also engaged predominantly in sloganeering. As a result of poor usage of the print and electronic media, most of the voters did not know the candidates seeking election for the State Houses of Assembly elections even within their constituencies. In some cases, the campaigns deviated to digging up unpleasant stories about their opponents and calling for their disqualification. Some even resorted to removal of opponents’ posters.
To a large extent, most of the campaign strategies were sustained during the 2019 campaigns. Most of the candidates also sought to identify with political financiers and godfathers, whom they held in awe as the guarantors for successful election into the State Houses of Assembly.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This chapter presents what was previously discussed in the research work as a whole. It draws conclusion and make recommendations on the subject matter.
Summary
The study is structured into six chapters; each chapter discussed a particular aspect of the work. Chapter one, the introduction included the following: statement of the problem, objectives and significance of the study, research questions/Basic Assumptions, as well as the statement of the problem, furthermore it considers the scope and limitation of the study and definition of key words. Chapter two was devoted to review of available and related literature as well as explains the theoretical perspective from which the study is conceived. Chapter Three deals with the overview of legislative oversight by the national assembly. Chapter Four deals with legislative oversight and governance in plateau state and finally, the last chapter being chapter five summarizes the study, draws conclusion and makes recommendations based on the findings.
Conclusion
In a system of Representative Government, Legislators are elected by the people to represent them and are expected to oversee how Government implements policies and expend revenues. The Executive/Federal Public Service in this context is accountable to the people through the legislators. The power to exercise scrutiny over the Executives and its agencies is conferred on the National Assembly by the 1999 Constitution and Senate and House Standing Rules/Orders.
National Assembly over the years, has considered and passed laws to ensure accountability and transparency in every government spheres and had demonstrated and acted consistently to check Executive excesses and corruption in the Federal Public Service, however the daunting challenges of corruption, personal interest of legislators and the inability of the National Assembly to enforce sanctions had drifted oversight functions of the National Assembly through the examined probes/investigations to be at its lowest ebb in the National Assembly (2007 – 2012). These constraints constituted challenges that greatly hampered the constitutional mandate of the National Assembly.
Recommendations
In the light of the challenges and the findings of this study, it is appropriate to suggest the following recommendations as measures towards enhancing the performance of Oversight Functions:
- The ability of Committee to access required information to establish corruption or otherwise is dependent on its managerial and technical capacity, therefore Committees must be armed with requisite administrative/research support or appropriate consultancy services. Furthermore, for effective performance of Oversight, the National Assembly needs to strengthen civil society participation in all legislative process;
- The National Assembly also need to effectively and creatively use their powers to obligate Federal Public Servants to justify their actions/inactions publically through public hearings, budget hearings, investigations etc;
- The National Assembly should strengthen the effectiveness of its control mechanism and more often pressurize existing agencies (EFCC, Police, Judiciary, etc) to facilitate sanctioning of those found wanting in corrupt practices; and.
- National Assembly should also engage internal mechanism that will check and sanction legislators involved in corrupt practices.
References
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