Counterinsurgency in Northern Eastern Nigeria 2009 Till Date
CHAPTER ONE
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The objectives of the study are;
- To identify and discuss the major issues leading to the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria.
- To examine the Nigerian state‘s response to the Boko Haram insurgency with a view to determining its efficacy and suitability.
- To suggest possible measures for effectively counterinsurgency in Northern eastern Nigeria.
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Insurgency
Scholars and theorists have given different definitions of insurgency. While some of these definitions are closely related, others are not so related though contain common elements and this still makes the subject technically difficult. Perhaps insurgency is best understood by first considering what it is not. Insurgency is not terrorism or conventional war73 for example, though it shares with them some similarities such as the use of force or guerrilla tactics to achieve an end which is often political. Basically, the difference between insurgency and terrorism lies in the scope and magnitude of violence. While for instance, terrorism rarely brings about political change on its own, insurgency attempts to bring about change through force of arms. Similarly, terrorists often apply a wide range of damages when compared to insurgents. On the other hand, while conventional war involves adversaries more or less symmetric in equipment or training, insurgency involves adversaries that are asymmetric, weak, and almost always a sub-state group. Traditionally however, insurgencies seek to overthrow an existing order with one that is commensurate with their political, economic, ideological or religious goals (Gompert & Gordon 2008: 23). According to Kilcullen, “Insurgency is a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or a group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state challengers” (Kilcullen 2006: 112). Kilcullen also try to draw a line between classical and contemporary insurgencies thus: while the latter seek to replace the existing order, the former sometimes strive for the expulsion of foreign invaders from their territory or seek to fill an existing power vacuum (Kilcullen 2006: 112). Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines insurgency as “an armed rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognized as such by the United Nations) when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents.” The British Army counter-insurgency manual, Army Field Manual (AFM) defined insurgency as: “The actions of a minority group within a state, who are intent on forcing political change by a means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure, aiming to persuade or intimidate the broad mass of the people to accept such a change. It is an organised, armed political struggle, the goals of which might be diverse.” This definition also conform with the US Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) which defined insurgency as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” (Petraeus & Amos 2006: 1-1). Apart from the definition by Kilcullen and to an extent that of Oxford dictionary, the author does not totally agree with the other definitions as they fail to reflect the complexities of modern insurgencies especially with regards to their political, economic and social dimensions which Kilcullen simply describe as “struggle.” By implication, the other definitions branded insurgency as a predominantly military problem. However, in what seems to be a replacement of the 2006 FM 3-24 definition of insurgency, the 2009 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency Operations, defined insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”76 While the author agrees more with this definition by the Joint Publication, he wishes to stress that such definition excludes any insurgency that does not seek to overthrow or change the governing authority.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research design
The researcher used descriptive research survey design in building up this project work the choice of this research design was considered appropriate because of its advantages of identifying attributes of a large population from a group of individuals. The design was suitable for the study as the study sought to counterinsurgency in Northern Eastern Nigeria 2009 till date
Sources of data collection
Data were collected from two main sources namely:
(i)Primary source and
(ii)Secondary source
Primary source:
These are materials of statistical investigation which were collected by the research for a particular purpose. They can be obtained through a survey, observation questionnaire or as experiment; the researcher has adopted the questionnaire method for this study.
Secondary source:
These are data from textbook Journal handset etc. they arise as byproducts of the same other purposes. Example administration, various other unpublished works and write ups were also used.
Population of the study
Population of a study is a group of persons or aggregate items, things the researcher is interested in getting information on counterinsurgency in Northern Eastern Nigeria 2009 till date. 200 residents in selected local government in Borno state was selected randomly by the researcher as the population of the study.
CHAPTER FOUR
PRESENTATION ANALYSIS INTERPRETATION OF DATA
Introduction
Efforts will be made at this stage to present, analyze and interpret the data collected during the field survey. This presentation will be based on the responses from the completed questionnaires. The result of this exercise will be summarized in tabular forms for easy references and analysis. It will also show answers to questions relating to the research questions for this research study. The researcher employed simple percentage in the analysis.
DATA ANALYSIS
The data collected from the respondents were analyzed in tabular form with simple percentage for easy understanding.
A total of 133(one hundred and thirty three) questionnaires were distributed and 133 questionnaires were returned.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Introduction
It is important to ascertain that the objective of this study was to ascertain counterinsurgency in Northern Eastern Nigeria 2009 till date.
In the preceding chapter, the relevant data collected for this study were presented, critically analyzed and appropriate interpretation given. In this chapter, certain recommendations made which in the opinion of the researcher will be of benefits in addressing the challenges of counterinsurgency in Northern Eastern Nigeria 2009 till date
Summary
This study was on counterinsurgency in Northern Eastern Nigeria 2009 till date. Three objectives were raised which included; To identify and discuss the major issues leading to the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, to examine the Nigerian state‘s response to the Boko Haram insurgency with a view to determining its efficacy and suitability, to suggest possible measures for effectively counterinsurgency in Northern eastern Nigeria. In line with these objectives, two research hypotheses were formulated and two null hypotheses were posited. The total population for the study is 200 residents of selected local government of Borno state. The researcher used questionnaires as the instrument for the data collection. Descriptive Survey research design was adopted for this study. A total of 133 respondents made men, women, youths and NGOs was used for the study. The data collected were presented in tables and analyzed using simple percentages and frequencies
Conclusion
My argument and final conclusion therefore, is that the root cause of insurgency is traceable to bad leadership as one or two or even ten persons cannot successfully conduct insurgency. It is a collective of many who are often given almost cogent reasons why they have to join, and if they are already frustrated by bad leadership, they easily become victims. On the other hand, counterinsurgency as a state apparatus has the effects of not just destroying the state, or leading to the death of innocent civilians, but that it has a higher possibility of ‘almost justifiably’ leading a mere insurgency into a classical state of terrorism and for this reason, it is better to avoid any situation that can lead to insurgency than attempting to counter one.
Recommendation
It is now very obvious that neither the Nigerian government nor Boko Haram will accept that it is losing a ‘war’ which is bringing unprecedented levels of fear, pain and deprivation to civilians and the entire nation. The group has also repeatedly claimed that its increase in a campaign of terror is in response to the arrests, killings and detentions of its members in Maiduguri, Kano and Kaduna, among other areas. It is of course not possible to resurrect the dead, but it is possible to refine the living. If members of the group are so capable of conducting successful attacks, then they can be refined to convert such capability into state’s usefulness or developments. On that note my first recommendation would be to propose an amnesty plan for the group.
REFERENCES
- Ake, Claude, “Democracy and Development in Africa,” Brookings Institution Press, 1996. p. 48. As of November 30, 2012
- Bartolotta, Christopher, “Terrorism in Nigeria: the Rise of Boko Haram,” The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 2012. As of November 23, 2012: http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/09/terrorism-in-nigeria-the-rise-of-boko-haram/
- Bies, RJ, Tripp, TM. (1996). “Beyond distrust: getting even” and the need for revenge,” In RM Kramer and TR Tyler (Eds.) Trust in organizations: Frontiers in theory and research (pp. 246-260).
- Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Brown, Bert, “The effects of need to maintain face on interpersonal bargaining,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 4:1968. Pp.107-122.
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (2012), “Infant Mortality Rate,” As of December 3, 2012: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/fields/2091.html
- Chothia, Farouk, “Who are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?” BBC News, 2012. As of November 27, 2012: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501
- Cook, David, “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria,” Combating Terrorism Centre, 2011. As of November 27, 2012: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-innigeria
- De Waal, Frans. “Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals,” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
