Political Action and Secession Movement in Nigeria
CHAPTER ONE
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
Other specific objectives of study include:
- To determine the causes of secession in Nigeria
- To investigate on the victimization of secession movement before the war, during the war and after the war
- To determine the effect political action and secession movement on the economic situation in Nigeria
- To determine the state failure and security as indices of Biafra resurgence in Nigeria
- To proffer solution to the above stated problems
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretical Elements that Give Rise to Secession movement
This section focuses on the scholarly literature concerning the phenomenon of secession movements. It deals with several different theoretical perspectives on the phenomenon as to the cause of or perceived need to resort to secession activities.
The normative theory, the right to self-determination of those who want to keep the territory intact, is promoted by Percy B. Lehning, in his work, Theory of Secession: An Introduction. He claimed that the secession theory has two facets and provides two different liberal perspectives. The first one supports and the second one opposes the secession. The argument for secession centers on the right to self-determination. For him, pertaining to situations in which ethnic conflict has made living together impossible, people must be allowed, under the right of self-determination, to secede. Lehning comments on the universal right of people’s self-determination that secessionism aims to amputate, either forcibly or non-forcibly an independent state from part of a territory. He also argues that any group of people that is not satisfied with the way the central government runs the affairs of the republic has the right to secede (Lehning 1998, 2).
It is also a cardinal principle in modern international law that a people, based on respect for the principle of equal rights, and fair equality of opportunity, have the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international political status with no interference (Shaw 2003, 227). For Birch, individuals have the right of voice in a democratic state which falls in line with self-determination but added that once they are committed to a state, they should have a substantial grievance in order to justify their exit (Birch 1984).
The nationalism theory promoted by Kedourie is against the right to self- determination. He holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government (Kedourie 1960). Even liberalism theory does not recognize group rights as it relates to secession (Buchanan 1991b, 7), which is inconsistent with the notion of accepting freedom as the ultimate political value (Beran 1988). Lehning also proposes the “Communitarian Theory,” which focuses on the concept of living together peacefully to that of partition. He argues that the international community’s stance regarding secession should go beyond the rights of people to self- determination to consider the “living together principle” and values instilled within a group of people. Different communities should make rules to mutually share governance of the country instead of seceding (Lehning 1998).
In the same vein, Napoleon Bamfo, in his article The Menace of Secession in Africa and Why Governments Should Care: The Disparate Cases of Katanga, Biafra, South Sudan, and Azawad, the arbitrary colonial partitioning of the African continent makes each country in Africa vulnerable. For him, the European scramble for Africa exposed the countries to the concept of similar people having their own sovereign nations. He argues that the construction of artificially imposed European boundaries did not take into consideration the culture and the ethnic diversity of the continent (Bamfo 2012).
Robert Schaeffer, in his book Warpaths: The Politics of Partition, observes that secession movements fail to end violence or prevent future wars from occurring. It causes a domino effect that leads other minorities in the same states to seek self-determination. It also engenders weak economic states and leads to bad governance and a possible encouragement to other observant ethnic groups (Schaeffer 1990). After Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, the two countries fought a bloody territorial war from 1998 to 2000 and were again on the brink of war in 2005, even after a complete separation of their populations (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2009).
Another factor that scholars have identified is the ethnic and cultural differences factor. Oumar Ba, in his paper “Tuareg Nationalism and Cyclical Pattern of Rebellions: How the Past and Present Explain Each Other,” observes that ethnic diversity plays a big role in a separatism movement. He uses the illustration of the Mali ethnic sociological cleavage line which places the “white” Tuareg race on one side and the “blacks” on the other side. For him, the Tuareg are not the only ethnic group in the northern part of Mali and if they chose to secede, it is because they consider themselves different from others. This difference is salient in the political arena where the black race is more represented in government. He continues arguing that it is what also makes the south, where blacks are in the majority, more developed than the north, where the Tuareg live (Ba 2007). This situation is conducive to ethno-political conflict and violence (Brubakar and Laitin 1998, 425).
CHAPTER THREE
INTELLECTUALS AND SECCESSION MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA
INTRODUCTION
In conceiving modern Nigeria, the British imperial enterprise underestimated the likely problems of merging peoples of diverse cultures into a common political unit. With political independence, which became a reality on 1 October 1960, differences soon emerged as a serious obstacle to nation-building. In Nige- ria, as in other African states, the first decade after independence saw the collapse of democracies, civil unrest, military coups and civil wars that left the blundering African élite helpless.
Secession has remained a source of serious concern in Nigeria’s politics throughout its four decades of independence. From using threats of secession as an instrument in political negotiation, through several minority protest move- ments, to outright war, the inclination to construct national identities has remained pronounced throughout the country. This contribution aims to: (1) define the institutional setting for scientific research on issues linked to secession in Nigeria, which will help to clarify the conditions under which intellectuals are studying secession and the influence of these conditions on the overall issues linked to the subject; (2) examine the role of intellectuals and the social sciences within secessionist movements in the country; (3) identify the scientific subjects involved in secessionist polemics and review their exact contents.
Beforehand, an overview of the separatist incidents that have occurred in Nigeria since 1953 will be presented, as a background to understanding the evo- lutionary processes of nationalist consciousness among the country’s estimated 250 ethnic groups. This chapter will concentrate mainly on issues connected with Biafra’s secession (1967-70) and that of the Ogoni minority movement, which started in 1990 under the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The views of both Nigerian and foreign commentators on the national question will be analysed. Except where otherwise indicated, the views under discussion are those of Nigerian scholars.
SECESSION MOVEMENT IN NIGERIA: AN OVERVIEW
From independence onwards, Nigeria operated a three-region structure, as instituted by the colonial government. The regions (northern, western and eastern) guaranteed autonomy only for the three largest ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west, and the Igbo in the east. While the Hausa- Fulani exerted substantial political control as the overall majority, the political and economic life of the nation revolved around the whims and caprices of the big three. This order soon saw the various regional minorities agitating for individual autonomy – a demand to which the three major groups were reluctant to accede. Towards the end of 1963, however, the minorities in western Nigeria were granted a separate (mid-western) region, which increased the number of regions to four.2 This small concession was obviously not enough to quell increasing protests by minorities against majority domination. To make the situation worse, the large ethnic groups fought among themselves for control of the centre.
The challenge of Biafra (1967-70) marked the zenith of post-independence political brinkmanship in Nigeria. The horrifying passion that attended its thirty months of existence has today made the name ‘Biafra’ an anathema in the Nigerian geopolitical lexicon. Yet similar movements – albeit of lesser consequence – had preceded the Biafran one. In 1953, the northern region had threatened to secede, following a motion passed by delegates from the south proposing that Nigeria’s independence should be granted in 1956. The problem was that the north was not yet ready to compete politically and economically with the south in an independent union. The proposal was then temporarily dropped so that the union could remain intact.3 From this time onwards, secessionist threat as an instrument of political bargaining was a feature of Nigeria’s political evolution.
In 1965, eastern Nigeria witnessed the first violent secessionist movement. Vexed by what was perceived as the federal government’s unfair redistribution of oil resources, Isaac Boro declared the secession of his oil-rich Ijaw tribal group in the southeast. The rebellion, which failed to recruit mass support,4 was sup- pressed by military action. Nevertheless, group protests continued without receiving due attention by the government until the eve of the civil war in 1967, when more autonomous entities, in the form of federating states, were constitut- ed as a guard against multiple rebellions from aggrieved minority elements.5
The next serious threat to political stability came from the Yoruba tribal group, in the west. This conflict was sparked off by an attempt made by the rul- ing party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) to break the strength of the opposition party, the Action Group (AG). The NPC was a predominantly northern party, while the AG belonged to the western region. The NPC showed little tolerance for its opponents in the 1964-65 elections. As a result, the western region became a battleground for power struggles. There were widespread riots characterized by the destruction of lives and property as the various parties engaged one another in bloody feuds. The situation was so serious that a state of emergency was declared in the region. Later, prominent Action Group leaders were arrested, tried and imprisoned on charges of treasonable felony.
CHAPTER FOUR
TRENDS IN SEPARATIST AGITATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The attempt for Biafra secession from Nigeria in 1967 was not the first of its kind in Nigeria. The secession attempt itself was the culmination of the various contradictions within the Nigerian state. Various constitutions had been negotiated and adopted prior to 1966, but none addressed the fundamental social differences, political tensions, economic competition and ethnic imbalances that the Nigerian state had struggled with since amalgamation. Before the secession attempt by the Eastern Region that led to the war, the Hausa/Fulani, dominant in the then Northern region, and the Yoruba, who dominated the then Western region, had all contemplated, and sometimes threatened secession. Thus, Tamuno (1970) had traced the agitations for secession in the country to 1914. He noted that from Ahmadu Bello’s account, the north would have preferred a separate political future, instead of being yoked with the south in what the Sardauna termed “the mistake of 1914”. Then, the north, displeased with the amalgamation, threatened to secede from the union. Further separatist agitations in several parts of Nigeria occurred in the 1950s. According to Tamuno (1970), new constitutional arrangements and party political rivalries during that period accounted for this. During a constitutional conference in Ibadan in 1950, the Emir of Zaria had threatened that unless the north was allotted 50 percent of the seats in the central legislature, it would ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria. The colonial authorities granted this request. Further political developments around 1953 led to a chain of events which again put northern leaders in a mood for secession.
Towards the end of 1953, it was the turn of the Yoruba, in the west, to threaten to secede. This resulted from the contention over the status of Lagos (Awofeso, 2017). While the colonial authority and the rest of Nigeria wanted Lagos to remain a neutral territory as the federal capital, Awolowo and his party wanted it to be administered as part of the western region. As the disagreement raged, Awolowo sent a strong-worded cable to the Secretary of State in which he claimed the freedom of the Western region “to decide whether or not they will remain in the proposed Nigerian Federation” (Tamuno, 1970, p. 570). In the resumed constitutional conference of 1954 in Lagos, Awolowo’s Action Group vehemently argued for a constitutional provision for the right of any of the federating regions to secede from the federation. This was opposed by Nnamdi Azikiwe’s National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). The conference ended with an agreement that no secession clause would be written into the amended constitution.
The first call for secession from the eastern part of Nigeria came from the then Premier of the region, Michael Okpara, who openly threatened to cause a secession of the Eastern region from Nigeria as a result of the circumstances surrounding the federal elections of December 1964. The following year, after the Western regional elections where it was alleged that the NCNC was massively rigged out, calls for the secession of the Eastern region became more strident, especially from some of the party’s members in the Federal House of Representatives. There were other pockets of secessionist agitations in the Middle Belt region principally by the Tiv ethnic group, and another in the present Niger Delta spearheaded by Isaac Boro and his two other compatriots. In fact, Boro and his Niger Delta Volunteer Force declared the Niger Delta Republic as Independent State on February 23, 1966 and gallantly engaged the federal forces in a battle that lasted for only twelve days (Awofeso, 2017).
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
Against the backdrop of the renewed Biafra separatist agitations in the Southeast geopolitical of Nigeria, which currently pose the most formidable threat to the corporate existence of Nigeria as a political entity, this study explored the linkages between political governance and deteriorating material conditions of people on the one hand, and the rising wave of separatist agitations on the other. The study found marginalization and systematic “minoritization” of the Igbo domiciled in the Southeast geopolitical zone to have been elevated to an official state policy. Nonetheless, the study argues that while certain actions, inactions and policies of the Nigerian government, which are perceived to be targeted against the Igbos, have created the feelings of collective victimhood among the people, and which are often exploited to mobilize the people for separatist agitations, the failure of governance at various levels has produced a disconnect between the masses and the government. The study notes, therefore, that the feeling of relative deprivation and discontent with the system is not necessarily a product of collective victimization but a fallout of the inability of the government to fulfill its own part of the social contract it entered with the masses. Since the use of force has not solved, but rather aggravated, the problem, other strategies need to be experimented. These alternatives include:
- Genuine reconciliation: it is obvious that the wounds of the civil war are yet to heal. The three Rs policy (reconciliation, reconstruction and reintegration) of the Gowon’s regime did not also achieve its purpose. Therefore, the federal government should urgently establish a truth and reconciliation commission, and try as much as possible not to politicize its membership and activities. Its members should be drawn from respected members of the traditional institution, clergy and the academia. Their terms of reference should include to identify areas of friction between the agitators and the rest of the country, and proffer solutions on how to strengthen the
- The renewed agitation for Biafra is seen to result from the continued perception of inequities and injustice in the distribution of power in the country. As part of the reconciliation, government should correct this imbalance and injustice by strictly applying the federal character principle in the distribution of political appointments and amenities/infrastructure. Efforts should be made to include all states in the scheme of things in order to reduce the feeling of marginalization, exclusion and In order to address the infrastructural deficits in the south east region, which is part of the alleged marginalization of the region, the National Assembly should expedite action on the proposed South East Development Commission bill. When passed and assented to by the president, it will go a long way in disabusing the minds of the people of the region.
- Tinkering with the constitution to accommodate referendum could help remedy the Biafra Nigerian discourse on secession has been undergoing a rapid revision as it passes from an older generation, engaged in issues dividing the different interest groups in the country, into the hands of a more professional generation of intel- lectuals who are trying to offer an explanation of the national question (and who are also politically engaged, although in a different way). In general, incidents of separatism in Africa illustrate the problems inherent in nation-building in mod- ern African states. Regarding Nigeria, scholars have considered social injustice, economic redistribution and the political economy of corruption, they have examined ethnicity, assessed individual and group rights infringements, ques- tioned military dictatorships and illegitimate governments, focused on regime failures and reviewed the agonies of democracy. They have also investigated class inequalities, historical antecedents and leadership.115 Judged by its content and the manner in which issues are presented, the debate reveals the anxieties felt by a state in search of a common identity, which continues to elude it. For most scholars of the revisionist order, the problem with Nigeria is a product of internal factors to do with social injustice brought about by the domination of one group or part of the country by another.116 Whether the actual cause of ethnic national- ism in Africa is the internal factor of sectional domination or the external factor of colonialism, the truth is indeed, as King Solomon said, that ‘man has domi- nated [his fellow] man to his injury’.
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